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Image-based Malware Classification:
A Space Filling Curve Approach
Stephen O’Shaughnessy*
Technological University Dublin

ABSTRACT
Anti-virus (AV) software is effective at distinguishing between
benign and malicious programs yet lack the ability to effectively
classify malware into their respective family classes. AV vendors
receive considerably large volumes of malicious programs daily
and so classification is crucial to quickly identify variants of
existing malware that would otherwise have to be manually
examined. This paper proposes a novel method of visualizing and
classifying malware using Space-Filling Curves (SFC's) in order to
improve the limitations of AV tools. The classification models
produced were evaluated on previously unseen samples and
showed promising results, with precision, recall and accuracy
scores of 82%, 80% and 83% respectively. Furthermore, a
comparative assessment with previous research and current AV
technologies revealed that the method presented here was robust,
outperforming most commercial and open-source AV scanner
software programs.
Keywords: Space-filling curves, Morton curve, Z-order, malware
classification, visualization.
1

INTRODUCTION

The monetization of malware has prompted an upsurge in attacks
through schemes such as ransomware, credential stealer Trojans
and sextortion scams. AV vendors report receiving upwards of
350,000 samples per day, which makes manual examination
impossible and automation essential [1]. Automated tools such as
anti-virus scanners and sandboxes can quickly distinguish between
benign and malicious programs, but for the most part, do not
classify malware into their correct taxonomic family classes.
Classification of malware is crucial to the automation process, since
it can determine if a previously unseen malicious program is a new
or zero-day attack or simply a variant of an existing malware. This
will greatly reduce the level of manual intervention required for
variant samples, leaving analysts more time to focus on new
malware strains. Clearly, there is a need for a solution to the
classification limitations of AV scanners that is also scalable to the
large volumes of samples received by AV vendors daily.
_____________________________________________________
*stephen.oshaughnessy@tudublin.ie

Malware classification, like malware analysis, can be broadly
divided into two distinct areas: static and dynamic. Static analysis
involves inspection of malware code and structures in a nonrunning state, whereas dynamic analysis comprises monitoring the
malware in execution and examining behavioural data. A critical
step in the classification process is feature extraction, which creates
a subset of characteristic and discriminant features from a vague
collection of data. Feature extraction can also be carried out through
static or dynamic means.
Static features are extracted from non-running code by calculating
frequency or sequence metrics, such as n-gram or PE file header
analyses [2][3]. Dynamic features are extracted by executing
malware and recording the behaviour by monitoring its interactions
with the operating system, for example through API call sequences
and graph representations [4][5]. However, these methods are not
without their drawbacks. For example, n-gram analysis can only
capture short-distance context dependency within the n-words
window, so any word contexts outside of the n range are not
recognised; PE header analysis and dynamic methods can produce
a high volume of false positives as similar features may be present
in multiple malware families or even benign files.
Visualization and computer vision techniques have been explored
as an alternative to the more typical methods for malware
classification [6][7][8]. Visualisation is an effective way to
represent data, as it can summarize large volumes of binary or
textual data into a single source that can be interpreted by the
human eye or form a basis for further image processing. Malware
classification in this case consists of mapping the binary malware
files to 2-dimensional images. The resulting images contain a series
of characteristic textures that can be extracted as discriminant
features to create 'fingerprints' for identification and classification.
This paper presents a novel method of image-based malware
classification using space-filling-curves. Space-filling curves are a
family of mathematical functions that consist of a continuous curve
which passes through every point of a regular spatial region, such
that the spatial locality of the data is preserved. Therefore, data that
are close together in a one-dimensional binary will be grouped
close together in the two-dimensional visual space. The properties
of space-filling curves allow malware variants containing similar
code to map to images with similar patterns, from which
discriminant texture features may be extracted for classification.
The main contributions of this research are:
x
An evaluation of Space-filling curves for use in image-based
malware classification.
x
A scalable solution for classification ambiguity among AV
programs.
x
Three open source SFC datasets made available for further
research [9].
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RELATED RESEARCH

2.1 Image-based Malware Classification
Previous research has focused predominantly on the byte-to-pixel
representation for image-based malware classification, where each
byte in the binary file is directly mapped to a corresponding pixel.
This mapping, referred to as a “byteplot”, was first introduced by
Conti et al. as a method of reverse engineering binary files into a
visual image to enhance the capabilities of text hex editors [10][11].
Nataraj et al. were the first to apply the byteplot mapping to
malware classification [12]. The authors derived feature vectors
using GIST, a global feature descriptor that breaks images into subband blocks and computes features based on filters tuned to varying
scales and orientations. For evaluation, the authors compiled a
dataset, dubbed Malimg, comprising 9,548 samples from 25
malware families [13]. In [14] Nataraj et al. evaluated the byteplot
approach against dynamic analysis methods. Their findings showed
that, while binary-texture analysis provided comparable
classification accuracy results to that of contemporary dynamic
methods, processing time was 4000 times faster, with average
processing times of 60MS for each image compared to 4 minutes
for dynamic feature extraction. The work presented by Nataraj et
al. can be considered a benchmark in this field as several
subsequent research efforts have extended or been compared to
their work. In [15], Luo and Lo extracted features for classification
using TensorFlow and Local Binary Patterns (LBP) feature
descriptors on the Malimg dataset. The authors reported a
classification accuracy of 93.17% as opposed to 82.83% using the
method proposed by Nataraj et al. In [16], Yajamanam et al
conducted experiments to compare the GIST-based method using a
subset of features taken from the original method, which increased
processing time to 20ms per sample and returned a classification
accuracy of 98%. [17] Naeem and Naeem used a combination of
local and global feature descriptors to classify the Malimg dataset,
reporting a classification rate of 97.4%.
In contrast, little research has been conducted on space-filling
curves in this context. In [18], Baptista presented research in
classifying malware by type using Hilbert curves and a SelfOrganizing Incremental Neural Network. Due to the limited size of
the dataset, comprising 180 samples, 78 of which were benign, this
research would be considered insufficient to give any clear
indication of the merits of applying the Hilbert curve to malware
classification. Irwin and Pilkington [19] applied the Hilbert spacefilling curve to the problem of mapping malicious network traffic,
specifically the Blaster Internet worm. This mapping was for
visualisation purposes and performed no classification of the
malware samples.
2.2 Space-filling Curves
Space filling curves (SFC’s) are mathematical constructs, also
known as continuous fractal curves, the limit of which contain the
entire 2-dimensional unit square. First introduced by Peano in 1890
[20], there are several implementations, based on differing traversal
orders. In 1891, Hilbert defined a simplified variant of the Peano
curve [21]. Other variations include Moore’s curve [22],
Sierpiński’s curve [23], Gray-code curve [24] and Z-order or
Morton curve [25]. The Hilbert, Z-order and Gray-code curves are
evaluated in this research. In simple terms, a space-filling curve
follows a continuous path until it fills an n-dimensional space
entirely. SFCs can extrapolate data from one dimension into ndimensions while preserving the properties of the original data,
with the property that closely related data are grouped together in
the resulting n-dimensional space.

In [26], Wattenberg described a connection between space-filling
visualisations and the mathematics of space-filling curves. In doing
so, the author derived a proof for a perfect layout function using
jigsaw tree-maps and space-filling curves, identifying four
desirable properties of a layout function:
x
x
x
x

Stability: The ordering of information must be preserved.
Split neutrality: structural changes are handled smoothly so as
other regions are not affected.
Order adjacency: each similar item should be located adjacent
to each other.
Locality: layout regions should be relatively compact, rather
than long and narrow, to aid in clearly visualising regions.

Figure 2.1 presents a schematic view of how the space-filling curve
can be used to map data to an image. At left is a one-dimensional
layout corresponding to the binary data; the centre is the same
layout extended to a screen-filling curve, and at right is the actual
space-filling result. In this case, the different colour codes represent
different data types, such as printable characters or null bytes.

Figure 2.1: Mapping one-dimensional data to a two-dimensional SFC
image. (image courtesy of Wattenberg [26])

Binvis is an online interactive binary visualization tool that
generates images from binary files using space-filling curves [27].
Binvis is implemented using scurve, a library written in Python that
visualises binary files in several different curve representations
[28]. The scurve library was used in this research to generate the
images for classification. The scurve library uses four different
colour codes to map binary files using SFCs: white for 0xFF values,
black for 0x00, blue for printable characters and red for unreadable
or high entropy data. The latter includes encrypted, encoded or
compressed data so images displaying significant areas of red
signify malware that has been obfuscated in some way.
3

METHODOLOGY

The research presented in this paper provides a study of the efficacy
of space-filling curves as a means of representing malware as 2dimensional images that can be used to classify malware through
computer vision and machine learning. The method of the study
comprises four distinct parts: data gathering, data conversion,
feature extraction and classification.
3.1 Data Gathering
For the purposes of the evaluation experiments, a malware dataset
was compiled from the current VirusTotal academic collection,
using a selection of malware samples captured since January 2018.
The dataset comprised 9,235 Windows 32-bit executable samples
from 28 distinct families. The dataset represents a more up-to-date
set of samples than the Malimg and Kaggle [29] datasets, with some
of the most prevalent and current malware species in circulation
today, including many examples of obfuscated malware. In an
effort to reduce the possibility of mislabeling, each sample was
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compared for similarity using the ssdeep similarity hashing
algorithm [30]. ssdeep is an approximate-matching function that
compares files for similarity, using a scoring system from 0 for no
similarity to 100 for a high degree of similarity. For this research,
only samples scoring a threshold of 60 or above were retained, such
that each sample in the data set had at least a score of 60 compared
with every other sample in that family class. Since malware variants
share many similar characteristics, it was assumed that files above
this threshold were from the same family of malware. After
filtering, the resulting dataset contained 8,452 samples. Appendix I
shows the structure of the dataset, including the family type and
count for each class. It should be noted that benign files were not
included in the dataset, as the aim of this research was to classify
variants into their correct family classes, rather than detect between
malicious and benign samples.
3.2 Data Conversion
In mathematical analysis, a space-filling curve is a curve whose
range contains the entire 2-dimensional unit square or more
generally an n-dimensional unit hypercube, but for the purposes of
this research only the 2-dimensional space is considered, since the
output is a 2-dimensional image. In this case, the 2-dimensional
unit square represents an image of n*n pixels. SFC’s trace a
continuous curve through every unit square, i.e. pixel in the image.
To envision this for the purpose of malware binary-to-image
mapping, the code of the program can be considered a flattened out
1-dimensional line with the code being parsed sequentially, byte by
byte. The SFC maps each point (bytes) from the 1-dimensional
space to the 2-dimensional space (SFC image map) such that
closely located points in the binary file space will tend to also be
closely located when mapped using the SFC. Figure 3.1 illustrates
the traversal patterns of the Z-order, Gray-code and Hilbert curves
onto the 2-dimensional space.

(a)

(b)

(c)

Figure 3.1: (a) Z-order, (b) Gray-code, (c) Hilbert curve map ordering onto a
2-dimensional space

Following the conversion process using the scurve library, three
datasets were produced, one for each SFC mapping. The Hilbert
conversion method first determines the dimensions of input binary.
It then iterates through each coordinate point and maps this to its
data color class as discussed previously. The implementation of the
Z-order and Gray-code curves are similar, in that the scurve library
considers the bit range for each distinct chunk of binary data as
coordinates. In other words, the start offset is the first coordinate
and the end offset is the second coordinate. In the case of the Zorder code, a bit interleaving process then takes place. First,
decimal coordinates are converted to binary. Next, a corresponding
bit is taken from each binary coordinate and concatenated. This is
done in a cyclical fashion, resulting in a single number, called a
Morton code. For the Gray-code, the coordinates are XORed from
left to right. The resulting codes in each case represent the cell that
the binary chunk will occupy, which is mapped to a distinct colour,
depending on the data type.

Figure 3.2 shows the same variant sample taken from the Allaple
worm family, transformed into 2-dimensional tree-map images
using the Hilbert, Gray-code and Z-order formats. While
similarities can be drawn in terms of the texture regions within the
resulting images, it can be seen the layout patterns are distinctly
different.

(a)

(b)

(c)

Figure 3.2: scurve SFC representations of the same Allaple worm sample (a) Hilbert, (b) Gray-code and (c) Z-order curves

3.3 Feature Extraction
The feature extraction process is carried out using image feature
descriptors, which represent a set of salient points that can be
extracted from an image. These points can then be used as
discriminant characteristics to classify the image. Three feature
descriptors were chosen for evaluation based on their suitability for
texture feature extraction, namely Local Binary Patterns (LBP),
Gabor filters and Histogram of Gradients (HOG). The basic LBP
operator is a simple yet efficient texture descriptor, first introduced
by Ojala [31] which labels pixels of an image by thresholding a 3 x
3 neighborhood of each central pixel and converting the result into
a binary number. The resulting LBP code represents the grayscale
intensity for that center pixel. This research used an extension of
the original LBP, proposed by Pietikäinen [32], which accounts for
variable neighborhood sizes, making it more effective at varying
scales. Gabor filters [33] are linear filter for texture analysis. Gabor
filters have been shown to possess optimal localization properties
in both spatial and frequency domain and thus are well suited for
texture segmentation problems. They work by analyzing an image
in a specified orientation (direction), spatial width and frequency.
The HOG descriptor was first introduced by McConnell in a patent
for a pattern recognition method [34]. The HOG descriptor is
primarily used for object detection in images but has produced
favorable results in texture analysis, e.g., [35][36]. HOG
descriptors work by describing the distribution of intensity
gradients or edge directions in a localized area of an image. A
custom script in Python was used to determine the optimum
parameters for each feature descriptor algorithm.
3.4 Classification
Supervised learning algorithms were used exclusively in this
research since the class labels, i.e., the malware family names, were
already known. Supervised learning maps an inferred function
between the training data and the corresponding class label and uses
this function to identify class labels for unseen samples. Three
supervised machine learning algorithms were trained on the SFC
datasets: K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN), Random Forest (RF), and
Decision Trees (DT). Naïve Bayes and Support Vector Machines
were also tested but provided poor results and so are not presented
here. A crucial step in the model training phase is the choice of
parameters for the classifier. A search method was implemented to
determine the optimal combination of hyper-parameters, namely
GridSearchCV, which is part of the Python Sci-kit Learn library
[37]. With GridSearchCV, all the possible combinations of

2019 IEEE Symposium on Visualization for Cyber Security (VizSec)

Authorized licensed use limited to: Technological University Dublin. Downloaded on December 15,2021 at 10:07:40 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.

parameter values are evaluated, and the best combination is
retained.
3.5 Precision Metrics
In order to ensure robust classification models, their performance
must be tested. In this research, the performance metrics precision,
recall accuracy were chosen. Confusion matrices provided a
graphical view of how well each model performed. The
performance metrics precision, recall and accuracy are calculated
using values derived from the outcome of classification process.
These are:
x
x
x
x

True positive (TP): all instance of a class that are classified as
that class.
True negative (TN): all non-instances of a class that are not
classified as that class
False positive (FP): all non-instances of a class that are
incorrectly classified as that class
False negative (FN): all instances of a class that are not
classified as that class

Precision is the ratio of correctly predicted positive observations to
the total predicted positive observations. In this case, the ratio of
correctly predicted samples for a family to the total predicted as that
family i.e., ‘for all the malware labelled as a particular family, how
many were correct?’ The formula for calculating precision is given
in (1):
ܶܲ
ܲ ݊݅ݏ݅ܿ݁ݎൌ
ܶܲ  ܲܨ

(1)

Recall is the ratio of correctly predicted positive observations to the
all observations in actual class. In this case, it is the ratio of the
correctly predicted malware to the total number for that family, i.e.,
for each malware family, how many that should have been labelled
as that family, were labelled correctly? The formula for recall is
given in (2):
ܴ݈݈݁ܿܽ ൌ

ܶܲ
ܶܲ  ܰܨ

(2)

Accuracy is the fraction of correct predictions that the model
predicted correctly. The formula is given in (3):
 ݕܿܽݎݑܿܿܣൌ

ܶܲ
ܶܲ   ܲܨ ܶܰ  ܰܨ

(3)

Confusion matrices are a graphical way of illustrating the
performance of a classification model. A confusion matrix will
show true positives, true negatives, false positives and false
negatives; hence they can be used to calculate precision, recall and
accuracy metrics. The matrix rows represent the actual values of
the model, whereas the columns represent the predicted values. The
intersection of row and column give the true positive rate, i.e. the
model predicted the actual values correctly.
3.6 Validation
Efforts were made to reduce underfitting overfitting in the
classification models. Underfitting can occur when there is not
enough data to build a generalized model. Ultimately, the model
will fail to identify signatures or patterns in the data. Overfitting
occurs when the model fits the data too well, mainly due to it

capturing noise along with the underlying signatures or patterns in
the data. A model that is trained to fit slightly inaccurate data can
infect it with substantial errors and reduce its predictive power. To
reduce the risk of underfitting, a suitably large dataset was
compiled. Stratified k-fold cross-validation was used to minimize
overfitting. Stratification is the process of dividing members of the
data population into homogeneous subgroups before sampling. In
stratified k-fold cross-validation, folds are stratified such that they
contain approximately the same proportion of samples as the
original dataset. Cross-validation helps identify if overfitting is
present in the data by repeating the training and testing phases
multiple times, using all the different folds of the training set as
validation sets. Through experiments, the optimal value for k was
found to be 5.
4

EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS

Experimental analysis was carried out using the three SFC image
datasets described in section 3.2. Approximately 10% of the data in
each set was held for evaluating the classification models. Each
classification model was trained following the same procedure:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Compute the feature vector for each image sample.
Assign the family label to each vector.
Pass the feature set (vectors and labels) to a classifier.
Perform k-fold cross-validation.
Compute the average precision, recall and accuracy.
Compute the confusion matrix.

The performance results from the training phase are given in
Appendix II. Out of all the models tested, the KNN-HOG model
performed best using the Z-order dataset with precision, recall and
accuracy scores of 94.5%, 87.1% and 91.6% respectively.
The KNN-HOG Z-order model is now considered for closer
examination. The most important parameters to consider when
tuning the HOG descriptor are orientation, pixels-per-cell and cellsper-block. The orientation parameter represents the number of
orientation bins in the resulting histograms. Pixels-per-cell
determine the size, in pixels, of each cell. Cells-per-block
determine the size of each block in pixels. The optimum parameter
values determined were orientation = 16, pixels-per-cell = 60 and
cells-per-block=1. L2-Hys normalisation was used in order to help
improve invariance to changes in illumination. For KNN classifier,
the most important metrics are the number of neighbours, k, and the
distance metric used to calculate the distance between data points
or neighbours. The optimum parameter values returned were k=1
and the ‘cityblock’ distance measure.
Figure 4.1 shows the normalised confusion matrix for the KNNHOG model. The true positives are shown along the diagonal, on a
scale of 0 to 1, where 0 indicates no samples were predicted
correctly and 1 indicates all samples were predicted correctly. The
matrix shows that the model performed well in the training and
testing phase, with a true positive rate of 0.8 or above in 23 out of
28 families. The remaining families require further examination, as
their performance was below average. These were: Graftor (0.78),
Chir (0.70), Cryptowall (0.73), Locky (0.77) and Bitman (0.78)
families.
For each of these families, it was observed that most variants were
obfuscated in some way. Obfuscation, in this case, was ascertained
by calculating the Shannon entropy for each variant. Shannon [38]
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There is also a possibility of the malware being mis-labelled during
the data compilation phase. While precautions were taken to
prevent mis-labelling malware samples, as described in section 3.1,
some mislabelling may still have occurred. Additionally, if similar
obfuscation tools are used for encryption or packing, there may be
similarities between variants caused by signatures generated by the
tool. Ultimately, the solution to these limitations would be to
manually analyse all samples for positive identification, which
would not be feasible at scale.

(a)

Figure 4.1: KNN-HOG model confusion matrix

introduced a proof and formula for calculating entropy, which is a
measure of the degree of randomness for a given set of data.
Shannon entropy ranges from 0 for orderly or non-random data, to
8 for very random data. Obfuscated data exhibits a high degree of
randomness and so tends towards a high entropy score. Generally
packed malware will score between 5.5 and 6.5, whereas encrypted
malware will score above 6.5. The average entropy score for each
of the lowest scoring families is shown in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Obfuscated malware entropy scores

Family
Locky
Chir
Cryptowall
Bitman
Graftor

Entropy
7.63
5.76
7.51
6.90
6.99

It is evident from the high entropy scores in Table 4.1 that the
samples tested were obfuscated in some way, which impacted the
performance of the classification model for those families. The
confusion matrix also indicated a high correlation between the
Bitman and TeslaCrypt families, where the model predicted 21%
of Bitman samples as TeslaCrypt. Figure 4.2 illustrates samples
taken from both families. Visually, there are significant areas of
similar texture shared between the two sample sets, which
attributed to the model confusing TeslaCrypt for Bitman. Both
family sample sets were inspected, and visual similarities were
observed in a high percentage of cases. To support the visual
evidence, a deeper examination was carried out by disassembling
the malware binaries and comparing the code. It was discovered
that considerable chunks of code were very similar or identical.
Both families are types of ransomware malware, which would
explain some resemblances in code due to similar functionality.

(b)
Figure 4.2: (a) Bitman and (b) TeslaCrypt SFC samples

4.1 Model Evaluation
The KNN-HOG model was evaluated on the 10% subset, removed
before the model training phase. Stratified random sampling was
used to select the evaluation set in order to provide a representative
of the original sample data. Appendix III shows the performance
results from evaluating the classification models on the three SFC
datasets. As in the training phase, the KNN-HOG model performed
best on the unseen data, with precision, recall and accuracy scores
of 82%, 80% and 83% respectively. The performance metrics show
that the KNN-Model model trained on the Z-order data generalises
well to new data, as it can identify variants it has not seen
previously.
4.2 Time and Space Complexity
The time complexity of both the image processing and
classification stages were measured to evaluate the scalability of
the method presented here. If the method is to be considered a
feasible solution to the classification limitations of AV software, it
must be scalable to large volumes of data. The average time taken
to extract HOG features from each image was 6.88ms. The
classification time per image was 1ms. The time complexity of both
the image processing and classification stages can be considered
O(n) or linear as they will both grow proportionately to the size of
the data. The fast processing times per sample, coupled with O(n)
time complexity indicate that this method would be scalable to
massive datasets, such as the malware data processed by AV
vendors daily. In terms of space complexity, the processed images
require considerably less disk space than the original executables.
The Z-order image dataset is 183MB in size, with an average size
of 24KB per image, whereas the original executable dataset is
5.2GB with an average of 681KB per sample.
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COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

To test the model in a more real-world setting, two comparative
scenarios were set up. The first was a comparison with the byteplot
method presented by Nataraj et al. in [11], described previously.
The second scenario compared the KNN-HOG model against the
70 AV scanners on VirusTotal.
5.1 Comparison with GIST Byteplot Method
The KNN-HOG model was tested against the GIST method
proposed by Nataraj et al. This method uses byteplot mapping to
represent malware binaries as images. Feature extraction is
performed using GIST descriptors, which are global image feature
descriptors that break images into sub-band blocks and compute
features based on filters tuned to varying scales and orientations.
KNN is used as the classifier. Both methods were trained and
evaluated in the same manner as discussed in section 4. Table 5.1
provides a comparison of results for both methods.
Table 5.1: GIST vs. KNN-HOG performance

Method
GIST

Training
Prec. Rec. Acc.
91.0 91.0 91.0

Evaluation
Prec. Rec. Acc.
77.2
73.4 78.3

KNN-HOG

91.3

82.4

91

91.3

80.6

83.0

Prec = Precision; Rec = Recall; Acc = Accuracy

From table 5.1, both methods performed comparatively well in the
training phase with precision, recall and accuracy scores of
approximately 91% for each model. However, the KNN-HOG
method outperformed the GIST method on the evaluation dataset,
meaning that it generalized better to previously unseen data
samples.
To give a further comparison of the models’ prediction accuracies,
the following metrics were considered:
x
x
x
x

True positive rate (TPR): The proportion of positive
identified correctly
True negative rate (TNR): The proportion of negative
identified correctly
False positive rate (FPR): The proportion of negative
incorrectly identified as positive cases
False negative rate (FNR): The proportion of positive
incorrectly identified as negative cases

cases
cases
cases
cases

In the case of multi-class classification, a positive case is when a
sample is belonging to a particular class (malware family), whereas
a negative case is when the sample belongs to a different class. The
rate metrics are measured between 0 and 1. For the true rates, a rate
of 1 is most accurate. For the false rates, a value of 0 is most
accurate. Table 5.2 gives a summary of the results for the two
models.
Table 5.2: Model accuracy rates

Rate
TPR

KNN-HOG
0.94

GIST
0.88

TNR
FPR
FNR

0.99
0.002
0.06

0.99
0.004
0.12

While both models returned high true rates, the KNN-HOG model
returned a higher TPR rate, meaning it identified more true cases
correctly. Both models had low FPR rates, which means that for
each sample they did not predict many as belonging to another
family. The FNR was higher for the GIST model, at 12% compared
to the KNN-HOG model at 6%, meaning that, for each sample the
KNN-HOG model predicted less samples incorrectly as other
families. To give an example of this, out of a possible 55 Teslacrypt
samples, the GIST model correctly identified 44 samples correctly,
but incorrectly identified 10 samples as Bitman and 1 as Locky. In
contrast, the KNN-HOG model identified 53 Teslacrypt samples
correctly, incorrectly identifying 1 as Zmist and 1 as Bitman. The
results of the tests show that the KNN-HOG is a more robust model,
identifying less samples incorrectly.
5.2 Comparison with AV Scanners
VirusTotal is an online scanning engine, comprising 70 individual
AV scanners and provides reports on suspect files, URL’s and
cryptographic hashes [39]. The aim of this comparative assessment
was to establish how well the KNN-HOG model compared against
multiple commercial and open source AV scanning programs. The
samples from the previous experiments were used for testing. The
samples were uploaded to VirusTotal via a Python script through
the integrated VirusTotal API [40]. For each family, the resulting
scan reports were examined for the family variant name. A sample
was only considered as classified correctly if the AV scanner result
contained the variant name. The bar graph in Figure 5.1 represents
the classification rates of the KNN-HOG model (blue) and
VirusTotal scanners (red). It is clear from the graph the KNN-HOG
model outperformed the aggregated group of AV scanners by a
considerable margin on all samples tested, with the exception of the
Win32.Neshta family. In this case, the classification accuracy for
KNN-HOG model was 14% compared with 25% for the AV
scanners. Overall, the average classification rate for the KNN-HOG
model was 82.1%, compared to 12.7% for the VirusTotal scanners.
It should be noted that detection rates for the AV scanners were
considerably higher, with an average detection rate of 77.1%. For
example, although the classification rate for Dridex was 1.5%, the
detection rate was 83.37%. Upon inspection, the majority of
detections
were
assigned
generic
labels,
such as
Trojan.Downloader or malicious_confidence_100%. In these
cases, the AV scanners had detected malicious signatures in the
samples but failed to classify the malware into its correct family
class and so the sample is given a more generalized label. This
experiment highlights the ambiguity problem that is prevalent in
AV scanning tools.
Efforts have been made to reduce classification ambiguity by
standardizing the naming of malware, such as the Computer
Antivirus Research Organization (CARO) and the Malware
Attribute Enumeration and Characterization (MAEC). CARO
introduced a structured naming convention for malware in 1991
[41]. In the CARO scheme, malware is identified by type, target
platform, family and variant, e.g. Trojan.Win32.Bitman.A. Whilst
this method of naming is intuitive, few AV companies have adopted
this scheme fully and of those that do, many opt to use a customized
variation, which can add to the naming disparity between vendors.
MAEC is a structured language for encoding and sharing
information about malware, based upon attributes such as
behaviors, artifacts, and relationships between malware samples
[42]. The aim of MAEC is to provide a portable language
containing highly granular descriptions of malware with the aim of
reducing ambiguity between malware families. In a similar vein,
MAEC has yet to be adopted by most AV vendors. Without
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Figure 5.1: KNN-HOG Vs. VirusTotal scanners classification accuracy

widespread opt-in from AV vendors, this ambiguity problem will
worsen as numbers of malware increase, highlighting need for a
robust, scalable classification solution.

to an SFC image, as described previously. The resulting image
represents a visualisation of the behavior data, i.e., the process
information of the malware that is resident in memory. Memory

6

dump images for family variants are then classified in the same way
as the methods described in this paper. Initial testing on both
obfuscated and un-obfuscated malware samples has proved to be
promising, with considerable improvements in classification
performance over the static method alone.

CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH

The findings of the experimental and comparative analyses in this
paper reveal the potential use of space-filling curves for imagebased malware classification. Through experiments, it was shown
that malware variants can be mapped to a 2-dimensional space
using space-filling curves, from which discriminant features can be
extracted. Using computer vision and machine learning methods,
the features can be used to classify malware variants into their
respective families with a high degree of accuracy. The proposed
model was compared to the GIST byteplot method by Nataraj et al
and performed favorably, particularly against unseen data. Results
from comparative analyses with VirusTotal show the KNN-HOG
model can outperform the majority of commercial and open-source
AV scanner software programs with respect to classification
accuracy. The methods produced by this research could be used to
augment the performance of automated malware analysis tools by
increasing the classification rates of variants and thereby reducing
the ambiguity in malware labeling. O(n) processing time of the
proposed method highlights its potential to work on large scale
datasets. It is also modular, in that that it can be adapted easily to
include new families or variants.

A potential avenue of further research would be to implement
image segmentation for classification at a more granular level.
Segmentation could be used to partition the images into distinct
regions containing groups of pixels with similar textures. Regions
of interest in an executable binary could be extracted in this way,
leaving irrelevant data such as padding (regions of binary zeros) or
obfuscated sections, where the entropy would otherwise adversely
affect the classification algorithms.
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[2]

Current research by the author has focused on using dynamic
analysis through virtual machine introspection (VMI) in
conjunction with process memory dump parsing to extract dynamic
features from heavily obfuscated malware. As shown through
experimental analysis in Section 4, obfuscation presents an issue
for static analysis, since the data is scrambled by the encryption or
packing routines it is obfuscated with, making extraction of
discriminant features difficult. Dynamic analysis is immune to
obfuscation, since malware must be decrypted or de-compressed
when written to system memory before execution. In this case a
suspect binary is executed within a virtual machine and a memory
dump of the malicious process is produced, which is then mapped

[3]
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APPENDIX I: MALWARE DATASET STRUCTURE

Malware Family

Type

Count

Teslacrypt

Ransomware

1257

W32.Wabot

Worm

688

Installcore

Bundle installer

631

W32.Wapomi

Virus

580

Bitman

Trojan

518

Vilsel

Trojan

439

Cerber

Ransomware

386

W32.Virut

Virus

381

Emotet

Banker Trojan

363

Win32.Allaple

Worm

362

Win32.Dinwod

Trojan Dropper

343

Zusy

Spyware

300

Crytex

Virus

299

Bundl

PUA

263

InstallMonster

Adware Installer

250

Shifu

Banker Trojan

241

Androm
Autoit

166
137

Cosmu

Backdoor Bot
Compiler
Polymorphic
Virus
Trojan

Win32.Neshta

Virus

93

Locky

Ransomware

93

Cryptowall

Ransomware

93

Win32.Scar

Trojan

87

Dridex

Banker Trojan

70

Graftor

Adware

65

Trojan.Agent.BDMJ

Trojan Adware

63

Win32.Chir

Email Worm

49

Zmist

128
105
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APPENDIX II: MODEL TRAINING PERFORMANCE METRICS

9

Hilbert

Z-order

Gray-code

Model
KNN-LBP

Prec.
89.9

Recall
87.1

Acc.
89.7

Prec.
90.0

Recall
88.8

Acc.
90

Prec.
88.2

Recall
87.6

Acc.
90

RF-LBP

92.3

85.8

89.9

92.8

87.7

90.1

91.5

86.3

90

DT-LBP

82.6

80.8

85.3

84.7

83.4

85.1

84.3

82.5

85.1

KNN-Gabor

89.9

87.4

90

89.1

88.6

89.2

88.1

87.1

89.2

RF-Gabor
DT-Gabor

93.1
83.2

85.3
82.5

89.9
84.6

92.8
82.5

85.4
82.1

90.2
85.4

92.2
84.3

85.9
83.4

89.8
86

KNN-HOG

94.0

85.3

91.6

94.5

87.1

91.6

94.0

85.1

91.6

RF-HOG

92.1

90.9

89.1

92.3

91.4

89.5

92.6

91.1

89.5

DT-HOG

79.3

78.0

81.3

82.0

81.0

82.3

80.3

79.0

82.4

Prec. = Precision; Acc. = Accuracy
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APPENDIX III: MODEL EVALUATION PERFORMANCE METRICS

Hilbert

Z-order

Gray-code

Model
KNN-LBP

Prec.
66

Recall
65

Acc.
72

Prec.
76

Recall
73

Acc.
77

Prec.
73

Recall
71

Acc.
76

RF-LBP

68

62

72

80

70

76

73

70

77

DT-LBP

57

58

64

64

60

67

66

65

69

KNN-Gabor

75

71

75

75

74

78

76

79

79

RF-Gabor
DT-Gabor

66
57

63
58

72
65

81
62

70
60

77
66

79
67

71
69

79
72

KNN-HOG

78

72

77

82

80

83

80

74

78

RF-HOG

75

64

72

87

73

79

78

68

78

DT-HOG

55

56

60

59

57

60

60

61

65

Prec. = Precision; Acc. = Accuracy
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